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Abstract
Early retirement seems to plague social security systems in a number of
European countries. In this paper we argue that delaying retirement may
have two positive effects: it is likely to partially restore the financial balance
of the system, and it may foster redistribution among retirees. To obtain
such a double dividend the benefit rule of the initial social security scheme
must have the following two characteristics. First, it operates redistribution
within generations. Second, it is “biased” and induces early retirement.
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1 Introduction
In a number of countries workers tend to retire early, “too early” as it seems.
This trend appears to be due mainly to the incentives created by the re-
tirement systems. The design of the benefit formulas typically implies an
implicit tax on continued activity. Consequently, retirement often appears
to be premature, at least when we use a distortionless or an actuarially fair
retirement system as benchmarks. Yet, if we believe recent surveys, most
people tend to declare that they are happy with the current retirement age.
Obviously this makes reforms difficult.
This paper shows that when social security systems are redistributive
within generations, distortions cannot be totally avoided. Nevertheless, they
ought to be smaller than they are now. In other words, current distortions
appear to be excessive and cannot be justified by optimal policy design.
Instead, we argue that eliminating some of these distortions can be Pareto
improving. However, for such a Pareto improvement to be possible, we need
to pick the right counterfactual policy. Let us illustrate this point through
an example.
If you ask a young Belgian worker to choose between a social security
system that induces him to work up to age 62, instead of the current 57,
while receiving the same benefits, he will surely opt for the latter policy that
we label an unconstrained status quo.
If instead, you ask the same worker to choose between a social security
system that induces him to work up to 62 instead of the current 57 but add
that the benefits will be cut accordingly if he retires at 57, the outcome is
likely to be reversed. Between a policy consisting of postponed retirement
and a policy that we call a constrained status quo most workers will be better
off with the former.
In countries where over the recent decades social security has been overly
generous at the expense of future generation, the observed reaction of in-
dividuals in opinion surveys and in political elections is not surprising. It
is not easy to make them understand that the (Ponzi) game is over. The
iron law of pay-as-you-go social security is inescapable: the challenge of ag-
ing can only be met by raising taxes, increasing the implicit social security
debt, raising the age of retirement or/and cutting benefits.1 For a number of
reasons including tax competition, the first door is closed. Sound economic
1See Cremer and Pestieau (2000).
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analysis makes it difficult to further burden future generations. The second
door is thus also closed. We are left with the last two options: increasing the
activity rate of elderly workers or reducing social security benefits.
In this paper we focus on the first option, a reform aimed at increasing
the age of retirement progressively. This can be insufficient; adjustment in
benefits may also be required. We show that increasing the age of retirement
can be a Pareto improving reform in countries where it is today particularly
low.
Clearly, in a country without downward distortion on the choice of retire-
ment, and without redistributive benefit rule, we would not obtain such an
outcome. To achieve what we call the double dividend of postponing retire-
ment, we need a downward distortion the removal of which brings additional
resources. We also need a redistributive scheme so that most of the reform’s
cost is borne by individuals with relatively high earnings.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first provide some facts
concerning the falling participation rate of elderly workers and the ensuing
declining effective retirement age. Then, we discuss the notion of an opti-
mal retirement age. We show that in a second-best setting distortions are
unavoidable if there is some redistributive objective. Yet as we argue there
are ways of minimizing those distortions. In the last section we show that
decreasing some of the distortions that induce early retirement may result in
more revenue to finance social security, and in more income equality among
the retirees.
2 The retirement decision
2.1 Facts about early retirement
Before discussing reform it is important to grasp the factual features of the
retirement question. First, as Table 1 shows, the effective age of retirement
has been steadily decreasing over the last 50 years. Today the effective
retirement is much below the so-called normal retirement age, that is 65
in most countries. The effective retirement age is a synthetic measure of the
rate of participation of workers aged 50 and more. In other words it is a
summary statistics for a complex retirement pattern starting at age 50.
Aging always comes to mind when talking of retirement. It results in
part from a drop in fertility, but mainly from a steady increase in longevity.
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Table 1 - Longevity and effective retirement age in the European Union
(1960-1995)
Men Women
Life Retirement Life Retirement
expectancy age expectancy age
1960-65 95-2000 1960 1995 1960-65 95-2000 1960 1995
Belgium 67.9 73.8 63.3 57.6 73.9 80.6 60.8 54.1
France 67.6 74.2 64.5 59.2 74.5 82.0 65.8 58.3
Germany 67.4 73.9 65.2 60.5 72.9 80.2 62.3 58.4
Ireland 68.4 73.6 68.1 63.4 72.3 79.2 70.8 60.1
Italy 67.4 75.0 64.5 60.6 72.6 81.2 62.0 57.2
Spain 67.9 74.5 67.9 61.4 72.7 81.5 68.0 58.9
Sweden 71.6 76.3 66.0 63.3 75.6 80.8 63.4 62.1
UK 67.9 74.5 66.2 62.7 73.8 79.8 62.7 59.7
Source: United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects, 1998.
Blondal and Scarpetta (1998)
In the European Union the proportion of individuals above age 70 was .11
in 1995; in 2050 it will be .22. Table 2 provides detailed data on this for
seven countries. It shows that the demographic dependency ratio will double
in some countries by 2050.
This trend has dramatic implications for the social security system. Rough-
ly speaking and everything else being equal, it follows that either the average
contribution rate has to double or the average replacement ratio has to be
cut by one half. Why not then consider an increase in the age of retirement?
Is it not strange to observe that, whereas life expectancy is rising, the effec-
tive age of retirement has been steadily decreasing over the last 50 years, as
shown in Table 1. In other words, the problem is not just demographic; it is
also social and political.2
The trend towards early retirement has different causes. It can be ex-
plained by economic growth — after all, leisure is a normal good — and by
changes in preferences. However, the bulk of the explanation seems to rest
on the incentive structure implied by social protection programs aimed at
elderly workers: unemployment insurance, disability insurance, early retire-
ment schemes, pension plans.
2See Cremer and Pestieau (2000).
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Table 2 - Increasing dependency ratio
1995 2050
Fraction of people at least aged
Countries 50 60 70 80 90 50 60 70 80 90
Germany 34.6 20.7 10.5 4.1 0.4 47.9 35.0 21.7 10.6 1.5
Spain 31.0 20.6 10.2 3.3 0.4 48.8 37.1 24.7 10.4 1.7
France 29.7 20.0 10.3 4.2 0.6 44.8 33.0 21.0 10.1 2.1
Ireland 24.4 15.3 8.0 2.5 0.3 46.1 33.0 19.9 8.1 1.3
Italy 34.4 22.2 11.1 4.0 0.4 50.7 38.3 26.0 12.0 1.9
UK 31.2 20.5 11.2 4.0 0.5 44.5 31.7 19.6 9.5 1.7
Sweden 33.6 22.1 12.9 4.6 0.6 41.8 29.1 18.1 8.5 1.5
EU 15 32.2 20.6 10.6 3.9 0.5 46.3 33.9 21.7 10.1 1.7
Source: Calot and Sardou (1999)
To represent this incentive structure we use an extremely simple model
that allows us to introduce the concept of implicit taxation and of the op-
timal age of retirement. We don’t try to explain why the system of social
security is what it is. We understand that a number of features such as early
retirement programs or laxist unemployment and disability insurance may
be in part explained from the demand side of the labor market. Political
economy considerations offer additional or alternative justifications. There
are a number of papers trying to explain why a majority of voters may have
pushed for such a system that is considered today as unfit to meet economic
and demographic challenges ahead.3
2.2 A simple model
We use a two-overlapping-generations model. Individuals of type i have
productivity wi and represent a proportion πi of population. They work the
first period of life with length normalized to 1. They also work a fraction zi
of the second period (also of length 1) and retire for a period h− zi , where
h (6 1) denotes life expectancy. Total life thus lasts 1 + h and active life
1+ z < 1+ h 6 2. In the first period, they consumes ci and in the second di.
An individual’s lifetime utility is given by:
3See e.g., Casamatta et al. (2002), Conde-Ruiz and Galasso (2000).
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ui = u (ci, di, zi)
or, with the budget constraint,
ui = u (wi − si, wzi +Rsi, zi)
where si is saving and R a financial interest factor. For the sake of simplicity,
we will use a separable form with a quadratic disutility of work:
ui = u (ci) + β u
¡
di − z2i /γi
¢
(1)
where u (·) is strictly concave, β is a time preference factor and 1/γ gives
the intensity of preferences for early retirement.4 This parameter γ can be
viewed as measuring the capacity to work long time. In other words, it is a
health rather than a taste parameter. Note that zi cannot exceed a ceiling z¯;
by assumption zi < z¯ < h.
In a laissez-faire setting each individual chooses zi such that:
∂u
∂di
wi = −
∂u
∂zi
or with our particular function:
zi =
γi wi
2
. (2)
The more productive the worker, the later he retires. Also the healthier he
is the longer he can work. Recall that with our quasi linear utility function,
there is no income or wealth effect in the choice of z. With a more general
utility, one would expect zi to decrease with a wealth gain such as that arising
from intergenerational transfers.
Let us now introduce a PAYG pension scheme with payroll tax rates of
τ and a benefit p which for simplicity is assumed to be uniform but partially
related to the retirement age. We can now write the utility function as:
ui = u (wi (1− τ)− si) + βu
¡
Rsi + wizi (1− τ) + p (1− αzi)− z2i /γi
¢
4We realize that both separability and quasi-linearity are strong assumptions for the
problem at hand. They are mainly made for reasons of simplicity. It is clear that without
income effect we miss some of the effects of redistribution on the relevant decision.
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where α is a parameter giving the relation between pension benefits and the
age of retirement. When α = 0 aggregate pension benefits are independent
of the age of retirement; when α = 1, p represents yearly benefits. Now the
age of retirement is given by:
zi =
γi
2
[wi (1− τ)− αp] (3)
or
zi =
γi
2
wi (1− θi) (4)
with
θi = τ +
αp
wi
, (5)
where this parameter θi is the now famous implicit tax on prolonged activity.
2.3 The implicit taxation
This simple model yields predictions which are in line with observed behavior.
In particular, the age of retirement increases with the wage rate and with
health and decreases with the parameter θi which can be interpreted as the
implicit tax on prolonged activity. It includes the payroll tax as well as the
foregone benefits. This parameter θi decreases with wi and this is also what
is observed. It depends on α; in some countries α is close to 0, namely yearly
pension benefits don’t increase much for workers retiring late. The higher α
the stronger the distortion on the choice of the age of retirement.
The importance of this implicit tax varies quite a lot across countries, and
this variation explains in great part why effective retirement shows such a
wide range among the OECD countries. Figure 1 presents the international
comparison of Gruber and Wise (1999) which shows a tight relation between
implicit taxation and insured capacity. The indicator of implicit taxation is
the sum of the implicit taxes an elderly worker faces at each age during the
relevant period (55—65). The unused capacity indicator is actually one minus
labor force participation of workers between 55 and 65.
In view of ever increasing longevity, it would seem natural to reverse
the evolution towards early retirement. Such reforms face serious opposition.
A number of countries have been experiencing serious difficulties with their
implementation, despite an abundance of national and international expert
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Figure 1 - Implicit tax and unused capacity
NetherlandsItaly
Belgium
France
UK
GermanySpain
Canada
Sweden
Japan
US
R2 = 0.8113
0,2
0,25
0,3
0,35
0,4
0,45
0,5
0,55
0,6
0,65
0,7
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5
Logarithm of Tax Force
U
nu
se
d 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
U
nu
se
d 
Ca
pa
ci
ty
Source: Gruber and Wise (1999)
Table 3 - Desired and expected retirement age in France and Belgium
France Belgium
Age class Desired Expected Age class Desired Expected
18-34 54.3 62.2 < 25 55 60
50-64 56.4 60.3 > 50 59 60
Source: Assous (2001), De Vits (2002).
reports indicating the necessity to move quickly.5 Survey results on this is-
sue are quite interesting. Over the years they continuously show a majority
in favor of the status quo. In Boeri et al. (2001, 2002) which deals with
Germany, Italy, France and Spain, one finds that a majority of respondents
does not want any rolling back of their social security system. Table 3 gives
the desired and the expected age of retirement for France and Belgium. In
both countries, young workers would like to retire even earlier than today,
but expect that this will not be possible. The older workers have a narrower
gap between the desired and the expected age.
Why do we want to raise the age of retirement? For two related reasons.
5Among the most recent example, there is the series of OECD studies on how to improve
labor markets prospects for older workers in about 20 countries. See, e.g., OECD (2003).
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Table 4 - Costs of early retirement in some OECD countries as a share of
potential GDP (in %)
1980 1990 1998
Belgium - 15.2 13.5
Germany 7.7 9.5 10.9
France 6.2 11.3 10.5
Netherlands 8.1 10.5 10.1
Spain 4.8 9.7 9.2
UK - 7.5 7.6
Sweden 5.9 4.7 4.8
USA 5.8 5.4 4.7
Japan 2.9 4.7 4.8
Source: Herbertsson and Orszag (2001)
First given demographic dependency ratio which is going to double in the
next 3-4 decades, it is important to move in that direction to avoid a financial
crisis of social security systems. Second, there is a cost to so much inactivity.
Table 4 provides an estimate of the cost of early retirement in terms of GDP.
Not surprisingly, the cost is high where people stop working early.
3 Is there such a thing as an optimal age of
retirement?
3.1 Several retirement ages
The term retirement age is used in a variety of ways.6 There is the age at
which a worker is entitled to benefits labeled full or normal benefits. This is
referred to as the normal age of retirement (65 for men in most European
countries). There is also the age at which a worker is first eligible for some
retirement benefits; this is called the early entitlement age (60 in most coun-
tries). In addition to these there are entitlement ages for early retirement
schemes (below 60 and varying across sectors). Unemployment and disabil-
ity insurance do not have an entitlement age, although in many countries an
6See Diamond (2002).
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unemployed worker is treated differently when he is above a certain age (55
for instance).
What really matters is the effective retirement age which varies across
workers according to a number of individual or sectorial characteristics. For
example, people tend to retire later if they are healthy or relatively more
productive. In general, the self-employed retire later than salaried workers.
In the same way as the effective retirement age varies across individuals the
optimal age of retirement varies also quite a lot.
3.2 Optimal retirement age
In a laissez-faire economy, that is a market economy without social security,
people tend to choose to retire when the marginal utility of one year of
retirement is equal to the consumption value of one more year of work. As
we have seen in this previous section, with a quadratic disutility we obtain:
zi =
γi
2
wi.
Interestingly, this is also the condition that defines the (first-best) optimal
age of retirement. With the quasi-linear specification the age of retirement is
unaffected if an optimal retirement system is introduced. With a more general
utility function allowing for income effects, high productivity workers would
retire later and low productivity workers would retire earlier than in the
laissez-faire.
However, in the real world we have distortions that can be summarized
by the concept of implicit tax. Now the retirement age is given by expression
(4) and we have
zi =
γi
2
wi (1− θi)
where θi, defined by (5), includes the double burden of a standard social
security system: the payroll tax and the foregone pension benefits. Note
that the level of these foregone benefits varies substantially across countries.
In particular, it depends on the more or less contributory nature of the system
and on its actuarial fairness. With a pure Bismarckian system we have θi = 0.
Without going that far, one often defines actuarial fairness as the neutrality
of social security entitlements with respect to the age of retirement. In the
present setting, this implies α = 0 and we have θi = τ . We are then left with
the distortion arising from the tax system.
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Again we don’t want to explain why different countries have different
implicit taxes. This question is outside the scope of this paper. In a democracy
tax and social security systems hopefully result frommajority voting but each
individual’s vote may be influenced by a number of considerations pertaining
to the labor market or to specific views of equity.
What we know is that for demographic reasons current social security
systems have to go through drastic reforms. Assume that we have a social se-
curity system represented by τ , p and α. The link between contributions and
benefits is irrelevant at this point. In the simple model used here, “weekly”
labor is inelastic; only the age of retirement zi is endogenous.
Given this, a natural way out is to differentiate τ according to the periods
with τ 1 > τ 2 and to set α to 0 while keeping the overall budget constraint
balanced. The reason is simple: taxing young workers implies no deadweight
loss. At that age it is surely not an option to retire from the labor force.
On the contrary, taxing workers after 55 distort their retirement choice. It
is thus not surprising that over the last years there have been a number of
studies considering an age-related tax policy.7
In the appendix we study these issues by way of our simple model intro-
duced in Subsection 2.2. We derive the second-best optimal pension scheme
(payroll taxes and benefit rule). We show that for redistributive reasons,
some taxation in the second period remains desirable with a downward dis-
tortion on zi. This is the unavoidable distortion referred to above.
However, we also obtain the intuitive result that the tax is much higher
in the first than in the second period. This is because taxing first period
income does not affect the decision and thus implies fewer distortions. The
only reason why there is a tax in the second period, when retirement is an
option, is that this is a way to redistribute resources from high productive
workers to low productive ones.8 Consequently, we obtain that a reform
towards age dependent taxation, with τ 1 > τ 2, starting from an (otherwise
optimal) uniform policy (with payroll tax τ = τ 1 = τ 2) is welfare improving.
7Lozachmeur (2002), Kremer (1997). For the joint choice of weekly labor and retire-
ment, see Cremer et al. (2002).
8In a related paper, Jensen et al. (2002) argue that a Bismarckian system with actuarial
adjustment may dominate a Beveridgean system that is heavily distorted. They show that
even low-ability socio-economic groups benefit from such a shift.
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3.3 Avoidable distortions
Recalling that with a pure contributory system there would be no distortion,
and that by definition such a system cannot be redistributive, we realize
that redistribution is a potential cause of the problem. At the same time we
observe that redistribution is not the only reason for high implicit taxes. A
country like Sweden has a social security system that is more redistributive
than the French or the German one and yet it has a higher rate of activity
among its older workers. Table 5 presents data on implicit taxation (taxes
are cumulated over time) and poverty measures. There is little relationship
between those two variables.
If the implicit taxation cannot be justified by redistributive concerns, how
can it be explained? It can be the consequence of bad design of the tax/benefit
incentives. It can also result from the desire to favor youth employment by
forcing old workers out of the labor force. Bad design is not unusual. As
to the policy of encouraging youth employment through early retirement
schemes, it was popular in some countries some years ago but it is now
acknowledged to be quite ineffective, and therefore can be attributed to bad
design.9 Table 5 shows that there is no link between implicit taxation and
youth unemployment.
To put it differently we believe that today the only extenuating circum-
stance for implicit taxation of postponed work is redistribution, and that
therefore countries with high implicit taxes could easily reduce them. As we
show in the next section, such a reform may in some instances generate a
double dividend.
The double dividend can be obtained from our simple model. In the ap-
pendix, we have already shown that an increase in (effective) retirement age,
induced by a reduction in the implicit tax can be welfare improving (with
a utilitarian objective). This in itself is of course an argument in favor of
reform. However, the idea of double dividend we refer to is stronger. Our
point is that the increase in retirement age (the decrease in implicit taxes)
may actually result in a Pareto improvement. This comes about because the
able and healthy are better of because they face a smaller implicit tax (and
choose to work longer). The poor and unhealthy, on the other hand, are
not (or not much) affected by the implicit tax because they will continue to
retire early. However, they gain because the continued activity of the more
able generates more tax revenues and thus higher pension benefits. Observe
9See on this Boldrin et al. (1999).
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that this second effect, relies of course on the redistributive character of the
pension system.
To make this point in the simplest possible way we consider an even
simpler version of our model and assume that there are just two types of
individuals with w2 > w1, and γ1 = 0 < γ2 = 1. We start with α > 0
and τ high enough. We now consider a policy aimed at increasing the age
of retirement by working on incentives without increasing the payroll tax.
We now distinguish the payroll tax in the first (τ 1) and in the second period
(τ 2). We set τ 1 = τ and try to derive the value of τ 2 which maximizes the
value of p. The revenue constraint is given by
p (1− απ2z2) = w¯ (1 + π) τ 1 + π2w2z2τ 2 (6)
where π2 is the proportion of workers of type 2 and w¯ is the average wage.
Because γ1 = 0, z1 = 0; z2 = (w2 (1− τ 2)−αp)/2. Differentiating (6) yields:
dp
dτ 2
=
π2w22 (1− 2θ2) γ2
2− π2αγ2 (1− 2θ2)
.
Thus the maximum value of p for τ 1 and α given is reached for
τ ∗2 =
1
2
− αp
w2
.
Assuming τ ∗2 < τ 1 = τ , this implies that starting from a uniform policy
with τ 2 = τ 1 = τ additional resources can be collected without diminishing
the welfare of type 1’s individual and increasing that of type 2’s individuals.
These will work more and earn more enjoying more utility. Let us denote
∆p = p (τ ∗2)− p (τ) the amount of additional resources. When there is a de-
mographic shock they can be used to meet the increase in the dependency
ratio. We show in the next section on the basis of microsimulation model
that such a reform (decreasing τ 2 or alternatively fostering the age of retire-
ment) is preferable to a uniform cut in benefits. Here the percentage cut in
benefits would be equal to ∆p/p (τ). Admittedly this is a very particular
example which mainly rests on assuming an initial distortion (τ > τ ∗2) and a
redistributive pension system (here uniform pension benefits).
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Table 5 - Retirement, implicit taxation, poverty and unemployment
Unused
labor Men Implicit
force retired tax on Poverty Unemployment
(55-65) at 59 postponed rate rate
in % (%) activity (50%) (1999)
Total Elderly Total 15-24
Belgium 67 58 887 8.2 12.4 8.7 22.6
France 60 53 725 8.0 9.8 11.8 26.5
Italy 59 53 920 14.2 12.2 11.5 31.1
Netherlands 58 47 832 8.1 6.4 3.6 7.4
UK 55 38 377 13.4 13.7 6.1 12.3
Germany 48 34 345 7.5 7.0 8.7 8.2
Spain 47 36 249 10.1 11.3 15.7 28.3
Sweden 35 26 218 6.6 2.7 7.1 14.2
4 Increasing the effective retirement age
4.1 The right alternative
As we show above, raising the age of retirement is not very popular among
either young or elderly workers. It is thus a very delicate matter for a govern-
ment to reform the pension system in that direction even though increasing
rates of dependency make it urgent to move.
In our view people are not considering the right alternative. Or to put it
another way they are not using the correct counterfactual. To use an analogy
workers who are asked to choose between a 40 hour versus a 35 hour work
week, at the same weekly income, will choose the shorter work week. On the
other hand, if they have to choose between the two work weeks with a same
hourly wage, the outcome is far less obvious; a preference for the longer work
week can then not be ruled out.
Quite often when people are asked to choose between the status quo in
terms of benefits and retirement age and a new regime with postponed re-
tirement and about similar benefits (yearly pension) they will most likely
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choose the status quo. This is individually rational. However this decision
is based on an unrealistic alternative. With the dependency rate reaching its
peak in a couple of decades benefits will have to be cut, if both contributions
and retirement do not change. This is the iron law of pay-as-you-go systems.
There was a time when one could escape this iron lax by shifting the financial
burden to future generations. But today this is less and less possible.
The correct counterfactual is not an unconstrained status quo but a con-
strained one with constant retirement pattern but less benefits. To make the
two situations comparable, we must realize that the unconstrained status quo
is unrealistic: benefits have to be cut by an amount equal to the additional
revenue generated by postponing the age of retirement.
4.2 The case of Belgium: a double dividend
Following the methodology applied in the NBER International Social Secu-
rity Project, we consider a reform under which the various statutory ages
of retirement are increased by 3 years.10 The most notable ages in Belgium
are the normal retirement age of 65 and the early entitlement retirement
age of 60, which basically means that workers can draw benefits at 60, these
benefits being full if they have had a complete career. Increasing these two
ages by three years doesn’t mean that all workers will retire three years later.
Their retirement decision is surely influenced by the reform but also by other
considerations such as the other parameters of the system, their health, their
spouse’s income, etc.
Now we look at the impact of such a reform on the lifetime disposable
income of a cohort of workers aged 50 starting from that age until the end of
their life. Table 6 shows the increase in effective retirement age due to this
reform, labeled Reform 1. It concerns both men and women and five income
classes. The average variation is of 2.9 years.
Reform 1 will save a certain amount of money due to the increase in Social
Security contributions, and to the reduction in the benefits payment length.
(The other taxes are not taken into account in this exercise.) This amount
could be used to finance aging and can be expressed in percent of the sum of
retirement benefits. In our case the saving is equal to 21.32% of retirement
benefits. We now compare this scenario to one without reform, but with a
budget reduction of 21.32%. This budget reduction can be obtained by a
10Dellis et al. (2001).
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Table 6 - Average retirement age
Income
Quintile Baseline Reform 1 Variation
1 57.7 60.3 2.6
2 57.4 60.2 2.8
3 57.6 60.5 2.9
4 58.3 61.4 3.1
5 59.6 62.7 3.1
Table 7 - Percentage of individuals under the poverty line
Baseline Reform 0 Reform 1
50% of the median income
4.42 7.95 4.48
60% of the median income
10.09 16.21 8.96
uniform reduction of 21.32% of retirement benefits. This scenario is called
’Reform 0’. Now we will compare the redistributive impact of these two
reforms on the rate of poverty.11
In order to measure this impact we take the number of individuals who
are under the poverty line, the poverty line being 50% of the median income
in the baseline. We also take 60% of the median income in the baseline.
Table 7 shows that the number of individuals under the poverty line does
not increase under Reform 1, whereas it does increase largely under Reform
0.
There are clearly differences between a theoretical approach such as that
presented in the appendix and these empirical findings. Our theoretical model
is terribly simplistic. The tax-benefit schedule is linear. There is a lot of
monotonicity among the individual characteristics, productivity and health,
and the implicit tax, the level of benefits or the age of retirement. The welfare
11We use the poverty rate as a measure of redistribution. We realize that this is a partial
measure. Indeed in this illustration as well as in the theoretical example of the previous
section the reform does not improve the standard measure of inequality.
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of individuals is expressed in terms of utility. By contrast, our empirical model
is a very intricate black box with actual individuals and actual institutions;
it sometimes yields surprising results because no relationship is monotonic.
Questions such as marital status, completeness of the work career, type of
occupation matter a lot. Furthermore, our welfare indicator is lifetime income
and not utility. In other words, the disutility of working one more year is not
taken into account.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that delaying retirement ages might have a dou-
ble dividend effect. First, it will free resources needed to meet the challenge
of ageing. Second, in countries with redistributive social security schemes,
it will improve the lifetime welfare of those with low wages and bad health.
In assessing such a reform we use a counterfactual policy with unchanged
contribution rates and retirement age but with a cut in pension benefits.
There is an aspect that has been neglected in the above analysis: the
working of the labor market. It is clear that prolonging activity will call
for a reform of labor market rules, such as the seniority rule and the still
entrenched tradition of one job one life. Another aspect that was overlooked
is the idea that reforms don’t have to be linear. It is unrealistic to assume
that the reply to aging would be a uniform reduction in benefits. One could
hope that if benefits have to be cut the reduction would be lighter for lower
retirement benefits.
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Appendix
In the appendix we use our simple model to provide a formal treatment
of the points which are sketched in Subsection 3.2. We characterize the
second-best optimal pension scheme and derive payroll taxes and benefit
rule. Assuming R = (1 + n), we then show that the optimum implies τ 1 >
τ 2 > 0 and that a small decrease in τ 2 starting from the optimum uniform
tax τ = τ 1 = τ 2 is welfare improving. The same result also arises when
R− (1 + n) > 0, but not too large.
The resource constraint is given byÃ
1− α
X
i
πizi
!
p = τ 1
X
i
πiwi (1 + n) + τ 2
X
i
πiwizi. (7)
Denoting average income by w =
P
i πiwi and rearranging yields:
p = τ 1w (1 + n) +
X
i
πiθiwizi
where n is the population growth rate and the return to a PAYG system
while θi is the implicit tax defined by (5). Retirement age zi is chosen by the
individual and given by (4).
We now determine the optimal second-best pension system. We consider
two possibilities: same tax rate τ = τ 1 = τ 2 over the two periods and
differentiated tax rates τ 1 6= τ 2. With a utilitarian social welfare function, the
problem of the social planner can be represented by the following Lagrangian:
L =
X
i
πi
"
u (wi (1− τ 1)− s∗i ) + β u
Ã
γi
w2i (1− θi)
2
2
+ p+Rs∗i
!#
+µ
X
i
πi
·
wi
µ
(1 + n) τ 1 + γi
wi (1− θi) θi
2
¶
− p
¸
where s∗i denotes the optimal saving level resulting from−u0 (ci)+β u0 (di)R =
0. For simplicity, liquidity constraints are ignored; negative savings are not
ruled out. If we also assume βR = 1 we then have u0 (ci) = βR u0 (di) =
u0 (di).
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When tax rates are allowed to differ between periods, the FOC for a social
optimum are:
∂L
∂τ 1
= −
X
i
πiwi u0 (ci) + µ (1 + n)w (8)
∂L
∂τ 2
= −
X
i
πiw2i γi
·
β u0 (di) (1− θi)− µ
µ
1− 2θi
2
¶¸
= 0 (9)
∂L
∂p =
X
i
πi β u0 (di)− µ
+
X
i
πiwiγiαi
·
β u0 (di) (1− θi)− µ
µ
1− 2θi
2
¶¸
= 0. (10)
Expression (10) is not easy to interpret because of α which makes p not just a
lump-sum transfer but a linear levy. To simplify the interpretation we assume
α = 0.
With α = 0, combining (8) and (10) yields:
∂L
∂τ 1
= −
X
i
πi u0 (di) [Rwi − (1 + n) w¯]
= −
X
i
πiu0 (di)R (wi − w¯)− (R− (1 + n)) w¯
X
i
πiu0 (di) . (11)
The first term of the RHS of (11) is positive as the covariance between u0 (di)
and wi is negative. The second term is nil or negative if R ≥ 1 + n, which is
generally assumed. Consequently, for R = 1 + n we obtain τ ∗1 = 1.12 When
R > 1 + n, on the other hand, redistributive benefits of the uniform pension
are mitigated by the lower return from PAYG than from savings and τ ∗1 < 1
can no longer be ruled out.
The other tax rate depends on the quadratic distortion. It can be shown
to be equal to:
τ ∗2 =
−cov (u0 (di) , w2i )
−cov (u0 (di) , w2i ) +Ew2i Eu0 (di)
< 1.
12Recall that we have not liquidity constraints; otherwise τ∗1 < 1 would be required to
have a positive consumption in the fist period.
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Summing up, when R = 1 + n we have 1 = τ ∗1 > τ ∗2. The same result
holds when R > 1 + n, but not too large. For large R, τ ∗1 < 1 cannot be
ruled out, but it is clear even then extreme assumption would be needed to
generate a case where τ ∗1 < τ ∗2 would arise. For simplicity we concentrate on
the case where τ ∗1 = 1.
Let us now assume that for whatever the reason the two taxes are to
be equal: τ 1 = τ 2 = τ . Then the FOC with respect to τ is given by a
combination of (8) and (9):
∂L
∂τ = −
X
i
πiwi [u0 (ci) + β u0 (di) γi wi (1− τ)]
+µ
"
(1 + n) w¯ + (1− 2τ)
X
i
πi γi w2i
#
= 0.
This is equivalent to writing:
∂L
∂τ |τ1=τ2 =
∂L
∂τ 1
+
∂L
∂τ 2
,
with ∂L/∂τ 1 > 0 and ∂L/∂τ 2 < 0.13 By forcing the two taxes rates to
be equal we have a too high rate in the second period when distortion are
strong and a too low rate in the first period. It then follows that starting
from the optimal uniform tax τ 1 = τ 2 = τ ∗ and moving to τ 2 < τ 1, one
can increase social welfare. Note that this policy reform may even increase
the lifetime utility of everyone. In particular, as long as the optimal single
τ is above the tax rate maximizing the Laffer curve, one can collect more
resources and increase the welfare of all including the poor by a marginal
decrease of τ 2 starting from τ 2 = τ ∗. This latter point is further developed
in Subsection 3.3.
13Recall that we assume τ∗1 = 1 so that the first term is always possible. When 1 >
τ∗1 > τ∗2 some additional regularity condition are required to obtain the result.
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